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It is commonly taken for granted that Aristotle’s main concern in Categories 
is to propose a classification in which each thing occupies one, and only one, 
place in a hierarchy consisting of genera that are divisible into species. Any 
passage in this work that seems to contradict this assumption is considered 
perplexing or even taken as evidence of ‘a weakness in the foundations of 
Aristotle’s theory of categories’.1 So strong is this belief that the authenticity 
of 11a20–38, which comes at the end of the discussion of qualities in chapter 
8, has been doubted.2 The purpose of this contribution is to show that there is 
indeed a weakness, not, however, in Aristotle’s theory but in the commonly 
held assumptions about it. A full investigation of all problems involved and of 
previous research requires much more space than is available on this occasion. 
Thus, my main focus will be on chapter 8, and I will refer to the translation 
and commentary by J. L. Ackrill, a work that has been, and still is, hugely 
influential on determining how Categories is understood.3
This is how chapter 8 begins:4 ‘I speak of that in accordance with which 
men5 are spoken of as some sort of men (ποιοί τινες λέγονται) as a quality’ 
(8b25–6). In other words, the qualities to be discussed are those of particular 
men (τινες), that is to say, some accidental qualities as opposed to substantial 
(or essential) ones. The latter are qualities in accordance with which all 
members of a class belonging to a certain genus differ from all members of 
another class (or of other classes) of the same genus. At Categories 1b18–19 
Aristotle gives examples of classes of the genus animal: animal with legs, 
winged animal, etc. The species man can be spoken of as some sort of animal, 
not as some sort of man; some man (i.e. a particular man) can be spoken of 
as some sort of man (hence also as some sort of animal). In the first case we 
produce a definition involving a substantial quality, in the second case we 
make a predication involving an accidental quality.
This is Ackrill’s translation of Categories 8b25–6: ‘By a quality I mean that 
in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow’. The differences 
between this translation and the one proposed above are considerable and 
1 This is the verdict of Ackrill 1963, 109. 
2 One important instance is in Frede 1987, 13.
3 Günther Patzig’s appreciation has in all likelihood contributed to the influence: ‘Als eine Erklärung des 
Textes, die auch Sachfragen erörtet, hat Ackrill’s knappes Buch einen neuen Standard für die Interpretation 
antiker philosophischer Text gesetzt.’ Patzig 1996, 105. 
4 All translations are my own unless attributed to someone else.
5 I consistently use the word ‘man’ in the sense of human being.
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important. First of all, Ackrill takes this sentence as a definition of a quality, but 
if it were a definition intended to cover all types of qualities, ποιοί τινες (some 
sort of men) would represent an unacceptable restriction; this is presumably 
the reason for Ackrill’s ‘things’, as if the original had ποιά τινα (some sort of 
things). Secondly, ‘are said to be’ is a possible translation of λέγονται, but there 
are other possibilities; as I will suggest below, ‘are spoken of as’ conveys a 
sense of duration attached to the predication of ‘some sort of thing’ (ποιόν), as 
opposed to the predications of ‘doing’ (ποιεῖν) and ‘being affected’ (πάσχειν).
The chapter on quality in Categories should be read against the passage that 
deals with the proprium of substances at 4a10–b19. A substance is something 
that is capable of admitting (δεκτικόν) contraries like sickness and health, 
whiteness and blackness, while remaining one and the same thing. Substances 
alternate between, for instance, being sick and in good health, hot and cold. 
A change of this kind is an alternation (μεταβολή), and it occurs when a 
substance has undergone an affection (πάθος). To admit contraries (e.g. to 
be able to become cold after having become hot) is to change (κινεῖσθαι). A 
μεταβολή is not just any kind of change,6 but a change that comes about when 
one and the same substance alternates between contraries.
From the very beginning of the discussion of qualities, Aristotle is concerned 
with alternations. If A and B are things between which substances alternate, 
the alternation is not always symmetrical so that it is equally quick from A to 
B as from B to A. The first example is an alternation between a disposition and 
a possession, e.g. a disposition for knowledge and a possession of knowledge. 
A man who is disposed for knowledge is inferior at first but changes quickly to 
less inferior and by degrees to excellent, and once he has reached the point of 
excellence, he is no longer merely disposed for knowledge but in possession 
of it. When men are closer to a possession, they are better disposed; when 
they have a longer way to go, they are less disposed (9a7–8). Once knowledge 
has become a possession, the man possessing it usually remains excellent, 
‘unless there is a grand-scale alternation (μεγάλη μεταβολή) through a disease 
or something else of that nature’ (8b31–2).
When the pendulum swings quickly in both directions, both A and B are 
dispositions: 
Things are spoken of as dispositions if they are easily changed (εὐκίνητα) and alternate 
quickly (ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα), as, for example, heat and refrigeration, and sickness and 
health and any other things like that. For man is disposed in some way in accordance with 
them, but a man who comes into existence alternates quickly from hot to cold and from 
being in good health to being sick. (8b35–9a1)
6 Ackrill’s 1963 translation is confusing since ‘change’ is used for both μεταβάλλειν and κινεῖσθαι. 
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One very important feature of this statement is the contrast between ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
(the species man7) and γιγνόμενος, that is to say, any man who comes into 
existence (and eventually dies). This is not brought out in Ackrill’s translation: 
‘It is what are easily changed and quickly changing that we call conditions, 
e.g. hotness and chill and sickness and health and the like. For a man is in a 
certain condition in virtue of these but he changes quickly from hot to cold and 
from being healthy to being sick.’ The translation blurs the crucial distinction 
between how the species man and a particular man are spoken of. The species 
man is only disposed for things, it never possesses them. The implication of 
Aristotle’s text is that different species are disposed for different alternations: 
the species stone (like man) is disposed for heat and refrigeration, the species 
man (unlike stone) for sickness and health.
Why does Aristotle say that possessions are also dispositions, whereas 
dispositions are not necessarily possessions (9a10–13)? Not, as Ackrill 
suggests, because he would consider possessions a sub-class of dispositions.8 
The reason is rather that something like knowledge, which exists in the soul 
of someone (1b1–2), is a disposition when that someone is only disposed for 
it but both a disposition and a possession when he possesses it. Why both a 
disposition and a possession? I can think of at least two reasons. (1) When a 
man has reached the point of possessing some knowledge, he does not cease 
to be disposed for it. If he ceased to be disposed for whatever knowledge 
he possesses, any knowledge that he had once possessed but later forgotten 
would be irretrievably lost because he would no longer be disposed for it, i.e. 
capable of acquiring (admitting) it again. (2) If the species man is disposed for 
certain qualities, the members of the species cannot cease to be disposed for 
those same qualities.
In men, some things are both dispositions and possessions (as, for instance, 
knowledge), while other things are merely dispositions. Among the latter are 
heat and refrigeration: no man who becomes cold remains cold for the rest of 
his life, and a man who becomes hot does not stay hot forever.
To say that someone is better disposed or less well disposed is not to 
compare one man to another; it is to pass a judgement on, for example, how 
close a man’s disposition for knowledge is to the possession of that same 
thing. By contrast, the second kind of quality accounts for differences between 
7 This is how ὁ ἄνθρωπος is used here as elsewhere in Categories.
8 Ackrill 1963 uses the terms ‘state’ and ‘condition’ for ἕξις and διάθεσις. He thinks that there is a 
difference between ἕξις (‘state’) as opposed to διάθεσις, and ἕξις (‘possession’) as opposed to στέρησις 
(‘privation’). I think that it can be argued that ἕξις is the same in both cases, a possession, but viewed from 
different perspectives, either in relation to a disposition or in relation to a privation. I intend to produce 
arguments for this position elsewhere.
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men: some men are born with an ability to do something (ποιεῖν) and to avoid 
being affected by something (πάσχειν) with greater facility than others. 
Since the species man is disposed in some way in accordance with health 
and sickness, any man is always somewhere on a scale between these two 
contraries. But this does not account for individual variations, for whereas 
most men are disposed in fairly similar ways, some men are born healthy and 
others are born sickly. This ability/inability is not something that the species 
man possesses but something that some men (τινες)  – i.e. men who are born 
and pass away – possess.
Thus, one and the same thing, knowledge, can be counted both as a 
disposition and as a possession. It is simply not possible to draw up two lists, 
one for dispositions and the other for possessions and decide – using duration 
and changeability as criteria  – which quality goes where (see Ackrill’s efforts 
in 104–05). What is possible is to draw up two lists: one for dispositions for 
X, Y, Z, etc., the other for possessions of X, Y, Z, etc., but there would be no 
point in making such a list other than to determine which things can be both 
dispositions and possessions and which things can only be dispositions in a 
certain kind of substance. As for the ability that some are born with, Ackrill 
translates ‘natural capacity’, and as a result of this choice he finds fault with 
Aristotle: ‘it is surprising that Aristotle treats this as a distinct type of quality 
while saying nothing about capacities in general. One may have or lack an 
aptitude for trigonometry; but to say that someone is capable of learning 
trigonometry is not to ascribe or deny an aptitude to him’ (105). This is unfair: 
the first type of quality, disposition, is a capacity in general, and the second 
type, ability, is an aptitude. 
The predications of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν are central to the discussion of the 
second kind of quality but even more so to the discussion of the third kind, 
affective quality (ποιότης παθητική), which is treated together with affections 
(παθή), which are not qualities at all. In a comment on this passage Ackrill 
complains (107): ‘How can Aristotle include hotness and coldness in this 
group of qualities (9a30) when he has already classified them as conditions 
(8b36–9)?’9 The complaint is unjustified. First of all, Aristotle speaks of 
κατάψυξις, ‘refrigeration’, at 8b36, i.e. something that conveys the idea of 
alternation in one and the same substance that can be hot at one time and cold 
at another, but of ψυχρότης, ‘coldness’, at 9a31, i.e. a permanent quality in 
some things (Aristotle gives no example, but one could think of snow and ice). 
But more importantly, men become cold because they are disposed for getting 
chilled, so in the case of men refrigeration is a disposition. But things like ice 
9 As mentioned above, ‘condition’ is Ackrill’s 1963 translation of διάθεσις.
159Qualities in Aristotle’s Categories
and snow are not disposed for getting cold; they have admitted coldness once 
and for all. They are, in Aristotle’s terminology, δεδεγμένα (9a32, 36, 9b4), 
not things that are capable of admitting an alternation, δεκτικά. Aristotle’s 
example of the former is honey, which has admitted sweetness once and for 
all. Ackrill translates τὰ δεδεγμένα ‘things that possess them’, an expression 
which blurs the distinction between, on the one hand, τὰ δεδεγμένα and τὰ 
δεκτικά, and on the other, things that are disposed for something and things 
that possess it. Only things that are δεκτικά are disposed for something. As we 
saw above, the species man is merely disposed for knowledge; in the chapter 
on relatives, the species man is spoken of as capable of admitting knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμης δεκτικός 7a37). Now we have an answer to Ackrill’s frustrated 
question that was quoted at the beginning of this paragraph: in men coldness 
is a disposition (condition in Ackrill’s terminology), and when it occurs it is 
an affection that causes a change, an alternation; in things that have admitted 
coldness once and for all (like snow), coldness is a quality.
By now it should be clear why ‘are spoken of as’ is preferable to ‘are said 
to be’ as a translation of λέγεται at the beginning of the chapter on qualities. 
We speak of honey as something sweet10 and of ice as something cold, but we 
do not speak of a man who is scantily dressed on a cold day as someone cold, 
for we cannot divide men into cold men, hot men, and men who are lukewarm. 
We can say about the scantily dressed man that he is cold, but then we are not 
thinking of a quality of his but of an affection he is undergoing.
Men blush when they are affected by shame. The reason why this can 
happen at all is that the species man is disposed for different skin colours. But 
how about the second kind of quality, the inborn disability in some men not to 
be easily affected? Is there a Greek expression that indicates that someone is 
born with a disability not to be affected easily by shame or fear? I believe that 
there is. At 9b31–2 Aristotle has introduced what seems to be two new words 
in Greek (to judge from LSJ): ἐρυθρίας and ὠχρίας. They appear to function 
like some other Greek words ending in –ias, e.g. emias = one who is inclined 
to vomit, ὀξυθυμίας = one who is quick to anger. They should probably be 
translated ‘one who is inclined/quick to blush’ and ‘one who is inclined/quick 
to become pale’. Arguably Aristotle wants to demonstrate here that men who 
are spoken of as inclined/quick to blush, or as inclined/quick to become pale, 
are spoken of in this way in accordance with a disability not to be affected by 
anything, that is to say, in accordance with a quality. Thus, 9b28–33 should 
be translated as: 
10 Cf. how we speak of sweets and sweeteners.
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Things that come about from things that are easily dissolved and quickly removed are 
spoken of as affections. For men are not spoken of as some sort of men in accordance with 
them. For one who blushes when he is ashamed is not spoken of as someone who is inclined/
quick to blush, and one who becomes pale when he is afraid is not spoken of as someone 
who is inclined/quick to become pale, but rather as having been affected somehow. 
LSJ translates ‘of ruddy complexion’ with a reference to 9b31, and ‘one of 
a pale complexion’, with a reference to 9b32; accordingly Ackrill translates 
‘ruddy’ and ‘pallid’, probably from a conviction (erroneous to my mind) that 
Aristotle is here contrasting temporary blushes with permanent complexions, 
when he is in fact contrasting affections (not qualities) with a disability not to 
be affected (the second type of quality).
We have repeatedly seen that the notion of classification, with each thing in 
its own place and in one place only, is undermined by the text. We have seen that 
knowledge can be a disposition or a possession, and in either case a quality. But 
we also know from the chapter on relatives that Aristotle counts knowledge, 
disposition, and possession (among other things of the same kind) as relatives 
(6b2–3). At 11a20–38 he demonstrates that species of knowledge (such as 
knowledge of grammar or music) are always qualities, for we are spoken of 
as knowledgeable in grammar or in music in accordance with them, that is to 
say, because we are disposed for them or possess them. When knowledge is 
predicated, as when we say ‘knowledge of grammar is knowledge’, it is spoken 
of in reference to something placed below (a ὑποκείμενον).11 By contrast, 
when the genus knowledge is not predicated in reference to something placed 
below, but is what we would call a ‘grammatical subject’, it is a relative, for 
knowledge is knowledge of something capable of being known. Co-relatives 
(knowledge and something capable of being known) are placed opposite one 
another; they are ἀντικείμενα, and this is surely one reason why Aristotle, 
having reached this point in the Categories, sets out to discuss different kinds 
of ἀντικείμενα, relatives being one kind (11b17–14a25). We may now turn to 
Ackrill’s objection which was mentioned at the beginning of this paper:
The claim that a genus that is a relative may have species that are not relatives seems to 
conflict with Aristotle’s whole idea of a genus-species classification and categorial ladders. 
… Thus there is a nasty dilemma, and its existence points to a weakness in the foundations 
of Aristotle’s theory of categories. (108–09) 
11 Cf. 1b1–3.
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The answer to this objection is simply this: When knowledge is spoken of 
(predicated) in reference to a species placed below it, it is a quality; when it 
is spoken of (predicated) as something in relation to something else which is 
placed opposite it, it is a relative (πρός τι). This is how the categorial ladder is 
to be understood. When the first step (knowledge of grammar) is a quality, the 
next step (knowledge) is also a quality, and so is the following step (disposition 
or possession), until we reach the top of the ladder, quality. But no such ladder 
is involved in relatives. They exist side by side and are simultaneous. Thus, 
there is no reason to suspect the authenticity of 11a20–38.
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